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VALIDITY OF DISCRIMINATORY NONRESIDENT
TUITION CHARGES IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
UNDER THE INTERSTATE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Charles H. Clarke*
That the United States form, for many, and for most important
purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are
one people. In making peace we are one people. In all commercial
regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other
respects, the American people are one ....
-Chief Justice John Marshall'
Shapiro v. Thompson2 decided that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from requiring its
residents to reside there for a certain period of time before they can
receive public welfare assistance from the state. The majority opin-
ion contains an interesting footnote which reads:
We imply no view of waiting period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free educa-
tion, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish,
and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state
interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties
upon the exercise of the right of interstate travel.3
If the text of that footnote, apart from the implications of the
opinion as a whole, does not acknowledge the existence of sub-
stantial constitutional questions concerning participation by non-
residents as well as new residents of a state in the matters that
it mentions, then the acknowledgement of a substantial constitu-
tional question must require the express use of those three words.
Nonresidents, like other persons, are entitled to equal protec-
tion of the laws. Limiting the enjoyment of state benefits to persons
who have satisfied waiting period requirements can exclude non-
residents as well as new residents from state benefits in a way that
violates the equal protection guaranty, because the exclusion does
not observe permissible standards of classification. Although Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, gave the footnote
an undeserved compliment when they stated "the Court takes
pains to avoid acknowledging the ramifications of its decision,"4
*B.A. 1952, Bethany College; J.D. 1954, Univ. of Chicago. Member of
Michigan and Oregon Bar Associations. Professor of Law, Detroit Col-
lege of Law. See n. 7 infra.
1 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-14 (1821).
2 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3 Id. at 638 n. 21.
4 Id. at 655.
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they correctly said that "[t]he Court's decision reveals only the
top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are the multitude of situations
in which the States have imposed residence requirements including
eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations
or to attend a state-supported university."5
The cluster of substantial constitutional questions created by
Shapiro v. Thompson about state discrimination against nonresi-
dents with respect to the enjoyment of state benefits may turn
out to be the most phantom iceberg that the fundamental law has
ever met. The Supreme Court already has postponed, on the grounds
of mootness, a decision on the right of new state residents to vote
in state elections without observing a waiting period requirement.6
One can legitimately wonder whether the matter has been tabled
indefinitely like some proposed bill in the legislature.
Moreover, whether nonresidents are entitled to attend a state
college or university free of the higher, invidiously discriminatory
nonresident tuition charge, if the local educational needs of a state's
citizens have been completely satisfied, may prove to be the most
short-lived substantial constitutional question in the history of
the Court. Four short months after Shapiro the Court denied cer-
tiorari in a federal court case which had decided the question ad-
versely to nonresident students in Iowa.7 Later the Court sum-
marily dismissed, for lack of a substantial federal question, an
appeal from the California state courts where judgment had been
entered adversely to the claim of a new resident student who unsuc-
cessfully challenged a tuition regulation requiring a year's resi-
dence in the state before a student could become eligible to attend
a state institution of higher learning without paying higher non-
resident tuition." And so it is that basic constitutional issues that
reach into every nook and cranny of the land occasionally are
decided, summarily like the drop of the guillotine and as automati-
cally as the entry of a default judgment in a lawsuit to collect the
purchase price of a used television set.
5 Id.
6 Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
7 Twist v. Redeker, 396 U.S. 853, denying cert. from 406 F.2d. 878(8th Cir. 1969). The author was counsel in this case and its companion,
Johns v. Redeker, which followed in the aftermath of Clarke v.
Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966). In Clarke, the writer's
brother, then a law student, was held to be a resident of Iowa for
tuition purposes. Consequently, the author's bias about the matters
discussed herein is admitted. Others must determine whether the
article is as biased as the writer.
8 Kirk v. Board of Regents, 90 S. Ct. 754 (1970), dismissing appeal from
78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969).
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The disposition of the tuition cases promises to give everlasting
life to a segment of invidious discrimination by the states against
citizens of other states, whose legality, but not practice, had been
vestigial for a considerable time. This article is written in the hope
of preventing the perpetuation of that kind of constitutional error
by keeping the issues alive for discussion because, as the Shapiro
footnote indicates, they have a broad reach. At least one can hope
that the footnote's as yet unnamed "and so forth" will fare better
than the going forth of the late Mrs. Goforth. She died in a hurry.9
I. THE GENERAL CASE FOR A LIMITED MEASURE
OF EQUAL PROTECTION FOR NONRESIDENT STUDENTS
Most states have surplus educational facilities in the sense that
their facilities exceed the demand of their migrating and nonmi-
grating citizens, when demand is measured by current admission
and tuition standards which determine who is eligible for a state-
supported education.' 0 Under such a measure of demand, a ma-
jority of states have a larger inflow than outflow of students and
consequently have surplus educational facilities which exceed
the demand of their migrating and nonmigrating citizens. More-
over, a state that has a substantial nonresident student popula-
tion in its schools has surplus educational facilities in the sense
that it has more educational facilities than are needed by its citizens
who qualify for and want to receive a state-supported education at
home under current conditions.
Such surplus educational facilities exist either because a state
has decided to participate in interstate education extensively, or
for other reasons. If a state deliberately decided to let its surplus
facilities go to waste rather than share them with citizens of other
states, it would violate the Interstate Privileges and Immunities
Clause," which prohibits state "discrimination against citizens of
other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimi-
9 Mrs. Goforth was the leading character in a play written by Ten-
nessee Williams entitled The Milk Train Does Not Stop Here Any-
more (1964).
10 Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
11 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause protects citizens of a
state from discrimination by other states and is not to be confused with
the National Privileges and Immunities Clause in the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment which protects privileges and immunities
of national citizenship from state abridgement. The National Privileges
and Immunities Clause reads: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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nation beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States."' 2
Thus, in Toomer v. Witsell,13 the clause prohibited South Carolina
from excluding citizens of other states from its commercial fishery
in the marginal sea by charging 2500 dollars annually for a non-
resident fishing license when the charge for a resident license was
25 dollars. The state's licensing law was not a conservation meas-
ure;14 the fish in the fishery that would have escaped catch as a
result of the exclusion of nonresidents would have been wasted
by the state. Therefore, even if a state wants to participate in
interstate education to the smallest possible extent, it must share
its surplus educational facilities, like its fish, with citizens of other
states rather than deliberately let them waste.
Furthermore, under such circumstances a state cannot collect
higher tuition from nonresidents for the use of limited surplus
educational facilities. The fixed costs of a state's educational facili-
ties would be paid by the state's taxpayers and resident students if
nonresidents did not attend the state's schools. Resident tuition or
educational expenditures can be lowered to some extent merely
by admitting nonresident students at an equal tuition charge. The
collection of a higher, discriminatory tuition charge from nonresi-
dents permits a state to reduce resident tuition or educational ex-
penditures even more. Consequently, a higher nonresident tuition
charge requires nonresidents to pay more of the fixed costs of
governmental benefits so residents can receive the same benefits at
a smaller charge. That kind of discrimination is forbidden by the
precedents giving the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
a construction which prohibits the states from imposing discrimina-
tory tax levies upon nonresidents for the general benefits provided
by state government. 15 A state is absolutely forbidden from reduc-
ing tax burdens or other costs to its citizens by forcing nonresidents
to make good all of the reduction.
The underlying considerations are much the same when a state
adopts and follows a policy of maximum feasible participation
in interstate education. However, there is one significant difference.
Since interstate education in state schools is financed by a discrimi-
natory fee system, the state compounds the wrong done to nonresi-
dents by making a sacrificial offering of its own migrating students
to other states for discrimination. Thus, the states deliberately
participate in a discriminatory scheme by which their institutions
12 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 397-98.
15 Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
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for higher education, not just interstate education, are financed
by exacting a greater contribution for their support from migrat-
ing students, simply because they migrate. That is so because, with
a few exceptions, a severe imbalance between in-migration and
out-migration of students to state colleges and universities does not
exist in most of the states.16
No one has attempted to learn whether any state tries to use
the higher nonresident tuition charge as a means of spending less
revenue from resident tuition and the state's treasury than the cost
of educating its resident students. In order to accomplish that pur-
pose, a state would have to charge nonresidents more than the
cost of educating them. Although the states probably do not make
a profit from nonresident students if the cost of educating them is
determined by dividing the total outlay for all students who attend
a state's schools by the total number of such students, the marginal
costs of educating nonresidents may be substantially less than the
amount of tuition collected from them. In any event, the higher
nonresident tuition charge and extensive participation in interstate
education permit the states collectively to provide for the educa-
tion of a larger number of their citizens than the number that could
be educated with the funds now provided by resident tuition and
the states' treasuries. Nonmigrating students in a state now receive
an education at home, at a lower charge, without being displaced
by a state's migrating citizens who might return home for an educa-
tion if other states did not collect the higher nonresident tuition
charge but also refused to increase tuition or outlays from their
treasuries. In that respect, nonresident students are charged more
so that resident students will be assured of a state-supported educa-
tion at less expense to themselves and the state's taxpayers.
The validity of such a system of planned, interstate discrim-
ination certainly should be suspect. In Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander,17 where a state ad valorem property tax levied upon cer-
tain intangibles owned by nonresidents was invalidated by the
Equal Protection Clause because residents were exempted from
the tax, the state argued that equal protection would be observed
if each state were permitted to discriminate against citizens of other
states in the exercise of the taxing power.18 Since the state's pro-
posal was rejected out of hand, it would appear that a state cannot
offer its citizens as a sacrifice to other states for discrimination in
16 See Appendix, Tables I and 2.
17 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
18 Id. at 573-74.
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exchange for a reciprocal power to discriminate against citizens
of those states.19
It is very difficult to make a persuasive argument in support of
the discriminatory nonresident tuition charge even if the states
are allowed the benefit of extreme assumptions of fact that are
favorable to their case. It can be assumed for the purpose of dis-
cussion that the tax resources of the states are exhausted, the states
want to provide an education for the same number of their citizens
as the number who now attend state schools, the same amount of
money will be needed for that purpose as the amount now raised,
and the states cannot equalize tuition at a higher level and collect
more from all students who are educated at home. Under those cir-
cumstances, if migrating students were not charged more simply
because they migrate, the states still could collect the same total
amount of tuition that is now raised if tuition were fixed by stu-
dents' and their parents' ability to pay, provided students who could
afford to pay more would not attend private schools after tuition
was raised. But even if all who could leave would leave, the states
could simply reduce the resources that they have committed to
the education of such students. The loss in revenue caused by their
absence would be offset by the absence of its need. A refusal to
charge all students on the basis of ability to pay, while only mi-
grating students pay higher tuition, cannot be justified on the
grounds that nonmigrating children of the rich would not attend
public schools unless they received an education at a bargain price.
In establishing tuition rates by ability to pay, the states could,
if they so desired, consider a student's property, borrowing power,
opportunity for part-time and summer work, and any other factor
that sensibly constitutes a financial resource. Some student loan
and other financial assistance programs are administered in a way
that takes such factors into account. Nevertheless, ability to pay
would have to be determined primarily by the resources of the
students' parents because the resources of most students are not
large and also are substantially the same after an adjustment is
made for those who have working spouses, usually but not always
wives, who are not students. The use of parents' resources as a
yardstick occasionally could cause severe injustice to a few stu-
dents whose parents adamantly refuse to provide their children
with any help whatever in obtaining a higher education even
though they are well enough endowed to furnish a lot of assistance.
The injustice could be ameliorated to a large extent by establishing
19 The race restrictive land covenant cases said that equal protection
of the laws "is not achieved through the indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
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tuition scales which do not have steep rates of progression. Setting
tuition rates by ability to pay certainly would not require the large
disparity in absolute amounts paid by individuals that is accom-
plished by the federal income tax. If the discriminatory, nonresi-
dent tuition charge were eliminated and ability to pay were con-
sidered in establishing tuition rates, educational expenditures from
the state treasury should be increased. The absolute dollar amount
of the increase would be large in most states, but hardly oppressive
in relation to a state's tax resources. In any event, it seems fairly
certain that state systems of higher education could be supported
at their present scale with the resources of persons who pay tuition,
without equalizing resident and nonresident tuition at a much
higher level or increasing taxes, if the tuition charge were deter-
mined by the ability to pay of all persons who pay tuition. At
present only migrating students are effectively charged tuition on
the basis of ability to pay, since the higher tuition collected from
them excludes many students from an interstate education because
they do not have the ability to pay for it.
If the states eliminated the discriminatory tuition charge to non-
residents and fixed tuition for all students on the basis of ability
to pay, seats available to nonresidents probably still would be
sold to the highest bidders if the states could give an admission
preference to nonresidents who could pay higher tuition. However,
the admission preference would be unconstitutional if the thesis of
this article, that a state must give equal treatment to nonresident
students to the extent that it has surplus educational facilities, is
correct. The preference would not prevent any of a state's qualified
citizens from attending school if the state had surplus educational
facilities. Since it would not operate in fact among the state's own
citizens, it could not be applied to nonresidents.20
The same defect would exist if the state applied the preference
to only one of its schools where nonresidents were concentrated,
even if the state limited the number of its residents who could
attend the school to make room for nonresidents. The purpose and
effect of the preference to nonresidents who could pay higher tui-
tion under those circumstances would be to admit to the school
many more low income residents than nonresidents with smaller
resources, because the preference would exclude all such nonresi-
dents. Thus, nonresidents would not have substantially the same
access to a state's surplus educational facilities that residents had
to the state's facilities available to them.
20 Observance of equal protection depends upon the application as well
as the letter of the law, and a law that is fair on its face cannot be
used to mask unconstitutional discrimination. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1885).
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Moreover, an admission preference for the children of the well-
to-do because of the comparative wealth of their parents would be
unconstitutional even if the preference affected residents and non-
residents alike and was acceptable politically to the people of a
state. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections21 holds that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids a state from requiring a poll tax to
be paid before the right to vote can be exercised, principally because
a state cannot confer a voting preference among its citizens on the
grounds "of wealth or affluence or the payment of a fee."22 Those
bases for distinction do not have any relationship to voting require-
ments in the sense that those words mean "standards designed to
promote intelligent use of the ballot.."23 However, as Mr. Justice
Black observed, dissenting, the Court did not deny that disenfran-
chising delinquent taxpayers could not assist the collection of state
revenue, which is a permissible governmental objective.2 4 Conse-
quently, Harper decided that a state's means of collecting taxes
from delinquent taxpayers who can pay them are so ample that
disenfranchising delinquent poll and other taxpayers was a denial
of equal protection of the laws because the adverse consequences
of the disqualification would primarily be visited upon the poor
for the reason that they were poor rather than because of the state's
need for an expeditious way of collecting revenue. Therefore,
Harper holds that a state cannot treat the poor worse than others
to accomplish a permissible governmental objective when other
means of realizing the objective are admittedly adequate.
Consequently, in operating its schools, a state could not confer
an admission preference upon persons who could afford to pay
higher tuition if the state fixed tuition by ability to pay and de-
clared that it could educate any given number of students whc
could pay any amount of money that would be raised by a particular
tuition scale. In such a case, the state has declared that its resources
are adequate for the announced undertaking. Therefore, the admis-
sion preference would discriminate against the relatively poor
student because of his lack of wealth, not because of a lack of state
fiscal resources.
A policy of providing a more largely subsidized education to
their citizens at home with smaller outlays from their treasuries is
the reason the states charge nonresidents more tuition than resi-
dents. The matter can be better understood if consideration is given
21 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
22 Id. at 666.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 674.
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to what might happen if all migrating students suddenly came home
to claim a perch upon which they could roost. Citizens of Arizona,
California, Colorado, Indiana, and Michigan probably would find
seats aplenty because in 1963 and 1968 those states had large im-
balances of student in-migration over student out-migration,25 re-
quiring surplus educational facilities which educational planners
might be hard pressed to explain as a maximization of educational
benefits with a minimization of cash outlays for the people of the
states which they serve. On the other hand, students who were
citizens of Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania, some of which must be nearly the richest states
in the Union, might find that a ride on a San Francisco cable car
during the rush hour was the ultimate in lebensraum, while exper-
iencing none of the cable car's thrills. In 1963 and 1968, those states
had imbalances of out-migration over in-migration respecting public
higher education that were more than ten percent of the number
of students in their state schools. 2 6 In 1963, the ratio of students in
state colleges and universities in New Jersey to that state's im-
balance of outflow over inflow respecting state schools was 56,617
to 11,767. The ratio was 85,452 to 27,883 in 1968. The ratios for
Massachusetts were 30,425 to 6,378 in 1963, 67,998 to 8,457 in 1968.27
As in 1963 and 1968, other states that had more student out-migra-
tion than in-migration might be able to provide seats for all
of their citizens who were students by overusing their present
facilities.
For the states as a whole, however, the galling problem would
be finding more money, not more seats, even though more money
could be found. More money would be needed for the states' educa-
tional institutions even if enough seats existed. That would be the
case because the higher, nonresident tuition charge has become a
delightful fixation in state budgets for higher education, and the
revenue that it now yields would have to come from somewhere.
If all migrating students came home, it could not come from them
because nobody has ever suggested that a state could discriminate
against its own repatriated citizens. Actually, there is no mystery
about where the lost item of revenue would come from. It would
come from each state's beleaguered taxpayers or from resident
students by a general tuition increase or from both sources, although
the impact of those effects could be reduced considerably if tuition
was fixed by ability to pay after a minimum charge was set as a
floor.
25 See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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Fortunately, however, state legislators are spared the fear-laden
task of telling their constituents about an increase in taxes or resi-
dent tuition at the state university or the extremely radical proposal
that tuition should be determined by ability to pay.28 Many students
in the country want to migrate even when the exercise of that
fundamental right means a higher, discriminatory tuition charge
that at some state schools approaches full cost, and everybody
knows that migrating students are leaving, not coming home. Con-
sequently, everything can continue as it now is. Provision can be
made for the number of students now in state schools. Tuition need
not be raised for a state's citizens who are educated at home. All
state educational establishments can continue to operate at their
present magnificent scale. And all of these wonderful things can
be done without raising taxes. Larger contributions for the support
of the states' systems of higher education can be exacted from mi-
grating students simply because they migrate. Each state can pro-
vide a less expensive education for its citizens who are educated at
home by making outlanders foot the bill for its full cost when the
market permits.
It is unfortunate that such a marvelous plan, which produces
so much happiness and contentment, obviates the need for solving
sensitive political problems, and victimizes such a superficially
small number of people, is flawed by the circumstance that it is
patently unconstitutional. But on the other hand, perhaps it would
be a shame to mar such an ingenious device for invidious discrimi-
nation with the slightest taint of any legality at all.
The number who suffer from the discriminatory tuition charge
exacted from nonresidents probably is far greater than meets the
eye. Certainly many more than those who now are well off enough
to pay it are among its victims. The discriminatory charge makes
an interstate education impossible for the student who barely can
manage the resident rate of tuition. The desire of a student to go
to school in another state is not determined by the wealth of his
28 Michigan State University at East Lansing, Michigan recently tried
a very mild program based on ability to pay, under which tuition for
a resident student ranged from $369 to an astronomical $552 a year,
depending upon his parents' income. The program, said to have been
the only one of its kind in the country at the time, was killed before
it was two years old when some legislators served as willing con-
duits to transmit irate pressure from unspecified sources to the
school. Naturally, the schoors administration then, perhaps sadly,
announced that it would try to meet the needs of students from low
income families with a new formula. The school had to face realities.
The legislature funds the school even though the school is otherwise
autonomous under the state constitution. The Detroit News, May
19, 1969, at l1A.
DISCRIMINATORY NONRESIDENT TUITION CHARGES 41
parents. If the discriminatory tuition charge disappeared, inter-
state education might become much more extensive than it is, and
state universities that now boast they are truly national centers
of higher learning might see their boast come true.
If interstate education could not exist on a fairly extensive
scale without the discriminatory fee, then both should remain as
they are. However, the higher charge to migrating students cannot
be supported on the ground that interstate education cannot exist
without it. Even if the tax resources of the states were exhausted,
the same amount of money in relation to need that now is raised
by tuition could still be raised by that means if tuition were de-
termined by ability to pay. But the tax resources of the states are
not exhausted. A state can participate in interstate education exten-
sively even though it charges residents and nonresidents the same
tuition. All that a state has to do is determine the number of its
citizens to whom it wants to give a state-supported education and
establish facilities for them at home. Those of that number who
desire and can get a tax-supported education in other states would
be charged equal tuition there. The seats that were built for them
at home could be used by citizens of other states at an equal tuition
charge. Expenditures from a state's treasury that were not recov-
ered by tuition charges to nonresidents, in effect, would be spent
for the benefit of its migrating citizens who would receive a tax-
supported education in other states. No migrating student would
ask for a handout from the treasury of the state where he went to
school. Each state would spend from its own treasury for its citizens
only.
The fact that the parents of resident students usually pay taxes
to the state where their children attend school, whereas the parents
of nonresident students ordinarily do not, ought to be completely
immaterial to the issue of whether the higher nonresident tuition
charge is constitutionally permissible. The equalization of resident
and nonresident tuition need not result in a state's taxpayers pay-
ing more for the education of its citizens than nonresident tax-
payers must pay for the education of nonresident students simply
because the tuition rates made no adjustment for the much greater
amount of taxes that the citizens of a state pay to its treasury. A
state's taxpayers would pay more only if they did not receive sub-
stantially the same benefits in exchange for their subsidy to non-
residents who attended their schools. However, each state would
receive a substantial equivalent from other states for its expendi-
tures upon nonresident students if it eliminated the discriminatory
nonresident tuition charge and balanced student in-migration and
out-migration. Under those circumstances, the number of a state's
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migrating students who would receive a largely subsidized educa-
tion in other states' schools would be the same as the number of
nonresidents in that state's schools. Thus, the issue is whether a
state can discriminate against nonresidents who receive services
provided by state revenue when there is a nondiscriminatory means
by which the state can recover from nonresident taxpayers sub-
stantially all of its expenditures for the services received by the
nonresidents.
Interstate education could be administered feasibly if the states
would eliminate the higher nonresident tuition charge and balance
student in-migration with student out-migration. Of course, the
states would have to exchange information about nonresident stu-
dent populations. However, that hardly would be beyond the capa-
city of data processing machines in the age of the computer. Con-
sequently, it cannot be seriously argued that a limited equality of
treatment for nonresident students should be overridden by ad-
ministrative convenience.
The nonresident's case for a limited measure of equal treat-
ment depends upon the existence of state surplus educational facili-
ties respecting students who are educated at home. However, if the
states were required to observe a limited equality of treatment
toward nonresident students, the faint possibility exists that some
state might mulishly withdraw from interstate education com-
pletely and declare that instead of a horde of fellow Americans from
other states in its midst, the state preferred a lower teacher-student
ratio for its students and increased opportunity for its faculty to
engage in independent research, so that instruction at its schools
would be enriched. Who then would say that surplus educational
facilities available for use by nonresidents existed in the state?
The answer is that nobody would. However, if a state wanted to
withdraw from interstate education for those reasons, it certainly
could be required to adhere to them after the withdrawal was made
or else participate in interstate education on the basis of a limited
equality of treatment to nonresidents. In other words, after the
policies in support of a withdrawal were announced, a state could
be forbidden from brushing them aside for the purpose of meeting
any increased demand by its own citizens for a higher education.29
29 When South Carolina said that conservation was the reason for the
exclusion of nonresident fishermen from its commercial fishery in
the marginal sea, the Supreme Court said: "It is relevant to note
that the statute imposes no limitation upon the number of resident
boats which may be licensed, and it was stipulated that while the
number of non-resident boats fell from 100 to 15 between 1946 and
1947, the total number of boats licensed increased during that time
from 254 to 271." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397 n.30 (1948).
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If a state tried to do that, a court of equity could compel the state
to restore conditions that prevailed before it withdrew from inter-
state education or enter some other appropriate judgment.
However, if the states were compelled to charge nonresidents
an equal rate of tuition for the use of their limited surplus educa-
tional facilities, the possibility that a state deliberately would with-
draw from interstate education completely would be extremely
remote. If a state decided to provide no room in its state schools for
citizens of other states, then other states surely would arrange their
facilities to return the favor in kind to migrating students from
the particular state, and the withdrawal would accomplish nothing
more than mass repatriation. Instead of mass repatriation, each
state could adopt measures by which its migrating students would
receive a substantial equivalent from other states in exchange for
that state's equal treatment of nonresident students from its sister
states.
II. THE EQUALITY GUARANTIES OF THE CONSTITUTION
ASSURE ALL CITIZENS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ENJOY
THE ADVANTAGES OF ANY STATE
The Commerce Clause assures a large measure of equal treat-
ment by the states to citizens of other states. Since it usually forbids
discrimination adverse to the flow of interstate commerce and
favorable to intrastate or local commerce, the clause in effect pre-
vents a state from discriminating in favor of its own locality and
against other states. Naturally, citizens of other states are the
principal beneficiaries of that kind of protection.
Thus, the Commerce Clause forbids a state from discriminating
against consumers in other states for the purpose of giving local
consumers a preferential right to purchase the products of the
state.30 Producers in other states are given similar protection from
discrimination favorable to local producers with respect to access
to markets within a state for the purpose of sale. Furthermore, the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses
30 West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (a state cannot pro-
hibit the transportation of natural gas produced in the state to other
states for the purpose of providing consumers in the state with a
supply of natural gas); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
'553 (1923) (a state where natural gas is produced cannot require
that local demand for gas be satisfied at a reasonable price before
any of the product is transported to another state); H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (a state cannot deny a license
for a milk facility in order to prevent diversion of milk from local
to outstate consumers).31 ]Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery
Co. v. Andrews, 372 U.S. 939 (1964).
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forbid a state from discriminating against citizens of other states
with respect to the enjoyment of benefits within its borders by
prohibiting discriminatory business tax levies against citizens of
other states.32
Equal protection of the laws is not an all or nothing proposi-
tion. If a group otherwise qualifies for equal protection, but abso-
lute equality of treatment would preclude the creation of important
benefits, cause them to disappear completely or severely curtail
their enjoyment, the group is still not stripped of all right to equal
protection. Instead, equal protection of the laws must be observed
to the extent that the circumstances permit when absolute equality
of treatment is impossible to administer.
For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that giving
political subdivisions a voice in the state legislature is an important
state objective.3 3 However, an absolute observance of the one man,
one vote principle might cause the elimination of that objective.
Consequently, the Court has said that slight deviations from the
one man, one vote principle are permissible to realize the objective
"as long as the basic standard of equality of population among
districts is maintained. 3 4 Apart from necessary deviations of that
kind,3 5 voting power is distributed according to numbers as equally
as the circumstances permit. Similarly, although a state is not
obliged to incur the expense of providing an indigent criminal
defendant with the kind of defense attorney that only a small for-
tune can purchase, rich and poor criminal defendants must be
treated as equally as the circumstances permit, even though the
large cost to the state for the best that it can do brings the indigent
much less than a rich man can buy.36
32 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Chalker v. Bir-
mingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 552 (1919); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
33 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1969).
34 Id.
35 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1969) and Wells v.
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) may not permit any deviation for
that purpose or may hold that the permissible size of that kind of
deviation must be so slight that the deviation would be virtually
imperceptible. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade For the Holy
Grail of One Man-One Vote, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEw 219, 229-31
(1969).
36 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel must be assigned for the first appeal
of right so that the possibility of discovering hidden merit in the
accused's case will not be missed); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) (counsel assigned for the appeal must file a brief that men-
tions anything in the record which arguably might support an appeal
even though assigned counsel believes that an appeal would be
wholly frivolous).
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A state cannot protect a local interest by a discriminatory law
that severely curtails the interests of persons located in other states
when the local interest can be protected effectively without severe
discrimination. Thus, if a city provides for a supply of pure milk
by inspecting farms, it cannot minimize its administrative burdens
by prohibiting the sale of milk in the city from farms in other states
because it does not want to inspect beyond a short radius from the
city limits, when the alternatives of charging the reasonable cost
of distant inspections or relying upon inspections by a federal
agency are available.3 7 Similarly, if nonresidents as a class are the
source of a peculiar risk, a state cannot eliminate the risk by a
severe discriminatory imposition upon nonresidents when a less
severe, nondiscriminatory means is available for that purpose.
Consequently, the use of injurious equipment or methods by non-
resident fishermen would not justify their exclusion from a state's
commercial fishery, because the less drastic means of prohibiting
the use of offensive equipment or methods can be used.3s
However, some local values can be created or preserved only
by discriminating against persons in other states. The difficulty
of policing nonresident insurance brokers in matters of trustworthi-
ness and competency has permitted a state to limit insurance
brokerage to its residents.3 9 The prompt elimination of a health
hazard justifies commercial discrimination against outstate buyers
of dead farm animals because the curtailment of affected inter-
state interests is slight and the purpose of the discrimination is not
to create a local trade preference.40 Similarly, the Commerce Clause
does not prohibit a state from restricting the commercial and indus-
trial uses of water from its streams to ordinary riparian users when
that is necessary to preserve the streams for navigation, even
though the restriction discriminates against persons who would
like to use the water for commercial and industrial purposes in
other states.41 Naturally, the equality clauses of the Constitution
do not force a state to make the ridiculous choice of destroying
either a highway or the water interests of riparian users.
The Commerce Clause cases show that when state discrimination
against persons in other states upon some grounds other than state
citizenship is necessary to accomplish an important governmental
37 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (the discrimination
against outstate farmers was invalidated by the Commerce Clause).
38 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 389 (1948) (the more severe means
of discrimination would have violated the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
39 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
40 Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
41 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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objective, the value of the protected local interest must at least be
equal to the value of the outstate interests curtailed.42 However,
when it is necessary to promote a local interest by using state
citizenship as the basis for classification, the nature of the local
interest must be compelling.
Discrimination on the basis of race is always "constitutionally
suspect . . . and subject to the most rigid scrutiny. '43 The same is
true of lack of wealth.4 4 A similar suspicion attaches to discrimina-
tion on the grounds of state citizenship, where "bald assertion" 45
or a mere mention of supporting reasons "without further elucida-
tion"'46 will not justify the classification. Unlike the case of classi-
fication for regulation of business, where the state is allowed to
make the most of the worst possibilities that may be imagined from
a situation,47 possibilities alone will result in invalidation of the
classification when it rests upon state citizenship. Instead, the state
must precisely identify a compelling local interest and clearly
establish that its existence would be precarious unless discrimina-
tion against nonresidents is permitted.48
Classification on the grounds of state citizenship frequently
infringes the right to travel from one state to another. That was
true in Shapiro v. Thompson49 because the restriction upon welfare
benefits there discriminated against new residents who recently
had arrived in the regulating state as citizens of other states. The
right to travel includes more than mindless mechanical movement, °
and it reaches beyond the right to settle permanently in a state.
As stated in Shapiro, state governmental benefits whose enjoyment
is protected from impermissible state discrimination include
"schools, parks, and libraries . . . police and fire protection," 51 in
short almost all of the benefits that state government provides. Ad-
mittedly there are some situations where nonresidents must be
restricted to a more limited equal access to state governmental
benefits than are residents or even denied access completely. In
those situations, severe imposition upon nonresidents can be justi-
fied because preferential treatment of its residents by a state may
42 Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945).
43 McGlaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
44 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
45 Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418 (1951).
46 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1947).
47 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
48 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-638 (1969).
49 Id.
50 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
51 394 U.S. at 632.
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be necessary for the existence of some governmental benefits. How-
ever, no governmental benefit is excluded automatically and arbi-
trarily by the protection secured by the right to travel or the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The right to travel is so fundamental to the effective function-
ing of our federal union that its existence was implied as a right
of national citizenship by the Constitution, although its express
provisions do not mention it. 52 The right derives in part from the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause.53 The Supreme Court
has said that, like the right to travel, the right to freedom from
state discrimination on the grounds of state citizenship, secured
by the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, is indispensable
to the Constitution's conception of a federal union of states and
to its practical existence.54 Moreover, Sherbert v. Verner, 55 which
was cited in Shapiro, held that a state cannot deny unemployment
compensation benefits to persons who will not work on Saturday
because their religion forbids it even though a refusal to work on
Saturday hinders the reemployment of the unemployed. As with
freedom of religion, a state must adjust its institutions to accommo-
date the right to travel and the right to freedom from discrimina-
tion on the grounds of state citizenship when accommodation is
possible.
Naturally, a state can provide an admission preference for its
own citizens in its own schools. If a state could not do that, the
ratio of a state's citizens to the student body in some state schools
of national excellence or other attractiveness might be the same
as the state's share of the national population. That condition might
destroy some state schools because their cost of operation without
the discriminatory tuition charge would greatly exceed the value
of any educational benefits that the state's citizens would derive
from the school's existence. Nevertheless, since equal protection is
not an all or nothing proposition, nonresident students must be
given equal protection as fully as the circumstances permit.
52 Id. at 630-31.
53 Id. at 630 n.8.
54 "It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has
tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one
people as this.
"Indeed, without some provision of this kind removing from the
citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States,
and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States,
the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of
States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists."
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (footnotes omitted).
55 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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III. NONRESIDENTS ARE NOT EXCEPTED FROM THE PRO-
TECTION GIVEN BY THE EQUALITY GUARANTIES OF THE
CONSTITUTION TO RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES RELATING
TO STATE PROPERTY
Shapiro should have eliminated any doubt about nonresidents'
rights and privileges relating to state property that might have been
lingering from one or two of the older precedents. The case applied
the Equal Protection Clause to a state's treasury for the benefit of
residents of the state who recently had come to the state as citizens
of other states. The state treasury is an item of state property in
which the states always have had the most constant special interest.
Moreover, Shapiro was consistent with the development of the
fundamental law by the precedents.
For example, Geer v. Connecticut56 recognized that a state has
a qualified rather than an absolute ownership interest in things
ferae naturae within its borders, and held that the Commerce Clause
did not forbid a state from discriminating against nonresident con-
sumers in other states, respecting game birds killed within its
borders, by prohibiting their removal from the state. However, the
case did not authorize blanket discrimination by a state against
citizens of other states when a state controls the disposition of
resources that it owns. A later case decided that the Commerce
Clause prohibits a state from requiring shrimp caught in its waters
to be processed for food within its territory when the purpose of
the requirement is to favor the state's food processing industry at
the expense of competing industries in other states, rather than
to preserve a food supply for local consumption only.57 Afterwards,
the validity of the discrimination in Geer was questioned, 8 and
in Geer itself the discrimination was justified on the grounds that
it was necessary to preserve a local food supply.59 Unless a state
lets all persons apply for a recreational hunting license and issues
licenses to a limited number of applicants chosen by lot, equal
sharing of a state's game birds with citizens of other states might
cause the birds' extinction, even if the state limited the kill. Na-
turally, equal sharing to any degree need not be observed when
there would be nothing to share if it were required. 0 Moreover, in
56 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
57 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
58 Instead of affirming the proposition that a state can forbid the removal
of game killed within its territory, the court correctly remarked in
a later case that "[t]here is considerable authority, starting with Geer
v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), to support the contention ..
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 404 (1948).
59 161 U.S. at 534.60 Cf. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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the context of a discussion treating instances of qualified and abso-
lute ownership of property by a state intercdiangeably, Toomer v.
Witselt6l said that the "whole ownership theory, in fact, is now
generally regarded as but a fiction 6 2 with respect to the protection
secured to citizens of other states by the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
Toomer v. Witsell contains a dictum which says that when a
state supports one of its facilities by using taxes which only resi-
dents pay and license fees collected from all users of the facility,
it may charge nonresidents a differential respecting the expendi-
tures from tax funds to which nonresidents make no contribution.
The Court did not say how such a differential could be determined.63
However, two ways suggest themselves immediately and there
may be more, depending upon a state's system of taxation. One way
is to divide the amount that the state spends from funds to which
only residents contribute by the number of licensed residents who
use the facility. That method of making the calculation might result
in a comparatively large differential if a state subsidized its facility
extensively from such funds. The other way of making the determi-
nation is to ascertain on some average basis the amount of the
contribution in the form of taxes not collected from nonresidents
that is made by a resident, regardless of whether he is a licensed
user of the facility. That calculation would result in a small or
nominal differential. Since equality of treatment was the basic
theme of Toomer, the differential which the court referred to must
have been the smaller one.
However, the assumption in Toomer that a differential charge
was permissible respecting the use of a state facility, a commercial
fishery there, overlooked the fact that all states maintain public
facilities like roads and parks, even though all do not have com-
mercial fisheries. Furthermore, if they are enjoyed without any
kind of difference in treatment, when that is possible, a substantial
equivalent of public benefits, rather than an exact amount measured
by a jeweler's scale, will be exchanged among the citizens of the
states even though the exchange will not be in kind. Consequently,
the differential mentioned in Toomer is of doubtful validity. The
case actually did not raise the issue of whether it was valid. In
any event, it could be collected from nonresidents only when the
state spends from taxes which only residents pay.
61 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
62 Id. at 402.
63 Id. at 399.
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Moreover, Shapiro holds that when a state deals with its own
citizens, especially its new citizens, the Equal Protection Clause
forbids state apportionment of "all benefits and services according
to the past tax contributions of its citizens,"6' with an exception
allowed for insurance and perhaps similar programs financed by
individuals' contributions. Consequently, the absence of tax con-
tributions by nonresidents, especially when they are beyond a
state's jurisdiction to tax, cannot automatically justify discrimina-
tion against them with respect to a state's benefits and services.
Nonresidents, like residents, are entitled to equal protection of the
laws under either the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the Equal Protection Clause, or both.
One Supreme Court precedent, and perhaps another, excepts
rights and privileges relating to property in which a state has an
absolute ownership interest from the protection given to nonresi-
dents by the Interstate Privileges and Immunities and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. Heim v. McCall6 5 says that those clauses do not
prohibit a state from giving a preference to its citizens in hiring
labor for public construction contracts performed for the state or
its municipal subdivisions. That is all that the case decided with
respect to discrimination on the grounds of state citizenship. It
did not declare that a state can pay a workman it chooses to hire
less than its own citizens simply because he happens to be a citizen
of another state. Public construction contracts have been used by
the states for poverty and unemployment relief. Undoubtedly, a
state still can hire the poor and unemployed within its territory
before advertising for workmen in other states. It is doubtful
whether a preference beyond that should be permissible after
Shapiro.
McCready v. Virginia6 held that the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause did not forbid a state from restricting the right
to use its oyster beds, which it owned absolutely, to its own citizens.
The facts in McCready did not disclose the extent of the state's
oyster beds in relation to the actual or potential needs of its citizens
for that kind of property. Moreover, the nonresident there proposed
unqualified equal treatment, such as is observed in the use of a
state's public ways, rather than limited equality of treatment. Since
such a standard of equality is impossible to observe for all kinds of
state aid, it is hardly surprising that the restriction concerning the
use of the oyster beds was upheld.
64 394 U.S. at 632-33.
65 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
66 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
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Nevertheless, the Court in McCready apparently misunderstood
the relationship between the Equal Protection and Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clauses, and it was seriously mistaken about
the scope and kind of protection secured by both clauses. The Court
erroneously held that the Interstate Privileges and Immunities
Clause protected only those rights that were fundamental and inci-
dent to general rather than state citizenship and that the clause did
not protect special rights and privileges at all. As might be ex-
pected, gathering oysters on state land was a special, not a funda-
mental, right or privilege.
IV. THE SPECIAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES EXCEPTION
TO THE INTERSTATE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE SHOULD BE EXPRESSLY REPUDIATED
The erroneous fundamental rights construction of the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause, with its special rights and
privileges exception, first appeared in the lower federal court case
of Corfield v. Coryell,67 decided before the Civil War. Like Mc-
Cready, Corfield held that a state could permit all of its citizens to
gather oysters in its fishery and severely limit or completely deny
that right to citizens of other states. Recognition of such a power
in a proper case is of little consequence because in certain limited
situations a state ought to be able to discriminate against citizens
of other states under any standard of equal protection that is work-
able. If a state had to open the use of any of its land to citizens
of other states as a condition to letting its own citizens use it, the
principal beneficiaries of a state's land policy in some situations
might be citizens of other states, and a state would simply decide
to deny the use of some of its land to help its own citizens rather
than share it with citizens of other states in accordance with the
ratio of its population to the nation's population. Considerations of
that sort were recognized very early. The Court in Corfleld said
that: "[O]yster beds belonging to a state may be abundantly
sufficient for the use of the citizens of that state, but might be
totally exhausted and destroyed if the legislature could not so
regulate the use of them as to exclude the citizens of other states
from taking them, except under such limitations and restrictions
as the laws may prescribe."6 8 However, the Court in Corfield did
not deny citizens of other states equal access to the state's oyster
beds because equal access might cause the oyster beds to disappear.
Instead, the Court decided that the right to gather oysters on state
67 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
68 Id. at 552.
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land was a special right or privilege and that the Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause did not give citizens of other states
any protection from discrimination respecting special rights or
privileges.
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose of the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause was to secure imperfectly
to citizens of a state "equal protection of the laws"6 9 by other
states. A state was required to observe only an imperfect kind of
equal protection toward citizens of other states then because prior
to the Fourteenth Amendment a state had unlimited power to dis-
criminate against its own citizens, and when it exercised that power,
the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause did not put citizens
of other states in a better position than citizens of the regulating
state.7 0 As one author has said:
Under the more orthodox view, taken by [Chief Justice Taney
and Justice Curtis] in the Dred Scott case, the theoretically primi-
tive power of each of the states to create inequalities in rights
among its own citizens, or among them and outsiders who were
not citizens of any other of the United States, was deemed to
survive, under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause,
completely. Each state had the power, too, according to this more
orthodox view, to create inequalities in rights, even as against
citizens of other American states, provided only that it did not
deny to these any privilege or immunity that it accorded to its
own citizens generally. For the right to "equality" under the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause was deemed to confer a
right merely to that minimum privileges and immunities which
each particular state, in the exercise of its power to create special
privileges and immunities, might choose to accord its own citizens
as a group.7 1
Consequently, the erroneous special rights and privileges exception
from the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause that was
announced in Corfield v. Coryell offered to make a bad situation
worse. Comparatively, it had a more odious impact upon citizens
of other states than that which resulted when a state conferred
special privileges upon a favored few by discriminating invidiously
against all other persons, including its own citizens. The erroneous
exception reduced the very limited measure of equal protection
secured to citizens of other states by the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause. States were permitted to discriminate invidi-
ously against citizens of other states exercising "special rights and
privileges" by simply applying the impermissible standard of state
69 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
70 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406-07, 422 (1856).
71 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1096 (1953).
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citizenship, even though their own citizens enjoyed equal protec-
tion in the exercise of such rights and privileges as a matter of
policy.
72
The fundamental rights construction of the Interstate Privileges
and Immunities Clause, with its special rights and privileges excep-
tion announced in Corfield, had not been accepted by the Supreme
Court prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. Conner v. Elliott73 was
the only case in which the clause had been used by the Court as
the basis for a decision.74 In Conner, a widow who was domiciled in
Mississippi during her marriage contended that the Interstate
Privileges and Immunities Clause compelled Louisiana to confer
community property rights upon her with respect to property in
Louisiana acquired by her husband during their marriage because
Louisiana conferred such rights upon parties to marriages governed
by its law. The Court rejected her claim because Louisiana's law
"does not discriminate between citizens of the [state] and other per-
sons; it discriminates between contracts only."75
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause gave the citizens of each state the fundamental right
to receive equal protection of the laws from their state. A right
that is fundamental between a state and its own citizens is also
fundamental between a state and citizens of other states for the
purpose of the protection provided by the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause even if that clause is given a fundamental rights
construction. Thus, as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause conferred upon citizens
of a state the fundamental right to receive full equal protection
of the laws from all other states.
However, the special rights and privileges exception to the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause violates the guaranty of
full equal protection to citizens of other states. The exception per-
mits a state to deny equal protection to citizens of other states
even though the state must observe equal protection among its
own citizens in the matter of so-called special rights and privileges.
Consequently, the special rights and privileges exception to the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause could not have sur-
72 The fundamental rights gloss put upon the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause by the two judges who sat in Corfield v. Coryell
has been described as "a little meaningless rhetoric to excuse their
failure to apply the clause strictly as the clause was written." Id. at
1125.
73 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
74 2 W. CRossKEY, note 71 supra, at 1126.
75 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 594.
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vived the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the Equal
Protection Clause received a construction that left a state's power
to engage in invidious discrimination against all persons largely
intact. That is exactly what the early precedents construing the
Equal Protection Clause did.
The Slaughter-House Cases78 decided that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not prohibit state legislation conferring a monopoly
upon a favored few to conduct a slaughterhouse or butchering
business although that was previously a common calling. The ma-
jority of the Court also approved a fundamental rights construc-
tion of the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause which con-
tinued the limited measure of equal protection that the clause
secured to citizens of other states before the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The majority said that the "sole purpose [of the clause] was
to declare to the several States, that whatever those [fundamental]
rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as
you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the
same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of
citizens of other States within your jurisdiction."7 7 The quoted
language shows that the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
by itself would not have helped the butchers who were the victims
of the monopoly even if they had been citizens of other states, and
therefore entitled to the protection of the clause. The Court doubted
"very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview '7 8 of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Moreover, the Court made its thinking about that matter un-
mistakably clear when it said:
The proposition is, therefore, reduced to these terms: Can any
exclusive privileges be granted to any of its citizens, or to a cor-
poration by the legislature of a State? . . But we think it may be
safely affirmed, that the Parliament of Great Britain, representing
the people in their legislative functions, and the legislative bodies
in this country, have from time immemorial to the present day,
continued to grant to persons and corporations exclusive privileges,
... privileges which come within any just definition of the word
monopoly, as much as those now under consideration; and that the
power to do this has never been questioned or denied.79
The creation of the monopoly in the Slaughter-House Cases may
well have violated the very indulgent standards for the permissible
76 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
77 Id. at 77.
78 Id. at 81.
79 Id. at 65-66.
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classification of business activities which now are required by the
Equal Protection Clause and which usually allow classification on
any rational basis that might exist.80 Mr. Justice Field, dissenting,
seems to have remarked correctly that:
It is plain that if the corporation can, without endangering the
health of the public, carry on the business of landing, keeping, and
slaughtering cattle within a district below the city embracing an
area of over a thousand square miles, it would not endanger the
public health if other persons were also permitted to carry on the
same business within the same district under similar conditions as
to the inspection of the animals.81
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause was construed in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases in a way that virtually limited its protection to
Negroes and that authorized a state to grant exclusive privileges
without observing any standards for classification. A case that is
near the Slaughter-House Cases in the reports permitted the states
to prohibit women from practicing law because of their sex. 2 It is
clear that the states' primitive power to engage in invidious dis-
crimination largely survived the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as construed in the Slaughter-House Cases. Therefore, in
McCready, which arose after the Fourteenth Amendment and
held that the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause did not
prevent a state from denying nonresidents access to its oyster beds,
it is hardly surprising to hear the Court say that the right to use
a state's oyster beds "is not a privilege or immunity of general
but of special citizenship. It does not 'belong of right to the citizens
of all free governments' ..... 83 McCready was a contemporary of
the Slaughter-House Cases.
The unwarranted fundamental rights gloss affixed to the Inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause in those two cases made the
scope of the clause uncertain because of the limitless possibilties for
construction offered by the words fundamental rights, as verified
all too well by the history of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. However, it is fairly certain that the funda-
mental rights gloss did not mean those substantive rights which
until Griswold v. Connecticut 4 were protected by due process of
law, even though they were not mentioned in nor derived from
80 Cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 468 (1957), which invalidated an
effective monopoly to the American Express Company of the sale of
money orders in retail stores in Illinois by businesses that were defined
as currency exchanges because of an absence of reasons for con-
ferring such preferential treatment upon a single person.
s' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 87.
82 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
83 94 U.S. at 396.
84 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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specific guaranties in the Constitution. 5 The Slaughter-House
Cases rejected that conception of fundamental rights with respect
to the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.8 6 Instead, the words
fundamental rights as used in the context of the Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause apparently meant the immense bundle
of civil rights that citizens in the community customarily enjoyed.8 7
Rights that did not meet that description were apparently not
fundamental rights. Thus, the privilege of doing business in the
corporate form, once conferred by special enactment of the legis-
lature rather than by general laws, was said to have been "a grant
of special privileges to the corporators. '8 8 Similarly, the right of
a person to help himself to valuable resources on land owned by
a state was hardly a right that citizens in the community custom-
arily enjoyed.
Naturally, the uncertain meaning of the words special privileges
and fundamental rights led to unwarranted attempts to restrict the
scope of the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause by arbi-
trarily assigning only a few rights to the clause for protection.
The concurring opinion in Toomer v. Witsell said that it was "fair
to summarize the decisions which have applied Art. IV, § 2, by
saying that they bar a State from penalizing the citizens of other
States by subjecting them to heavier taxation merely because they
are such citizens or by discriminating against citizens of other States
in the pursuit of ordinary livelihoods in competition with local citi-
zens."' 9 That limited construction of the clause was not only re-
jected by a majority of the court in Toomer, but also by the judge
who made those remarks when he later wrote an opinion reaffirm-
ing the proposition, established much earlier,90 that access to a
state's courts by nonresidents is a right protected by the clause.9 '
The exercise of that right is scarcely an ordinary livelihood.
Furthermore, as might have been expected, the tendrils of the
special privileges exception to the Interstate Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause wrapped themselves around the Equal Protection
Clause itself. For example, what was fortunately the minority opin-
ion in Ex Parte Virginia,92 an early case concerning racial discrimi-
nation in the selection of state jurors, stated that the Equal Pro-
85 Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
86 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78, 80-81 (1872).
87 Id. at 76; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823).88 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,181 (1868).
89 334 U.S. at 408.
90 See, e.g., Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 560 (1920).
91 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
92 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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tection Clause "extends only to civil rights as distinguished from
those which are political [or social]."9 In time, the special privileges
exception to the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause ac-
quired a twin brother, the special interest exception to the Equal
Protection Clause. States occasionally asserted that the special
interest exception to the Equal Protection Clause should .include
subjects which would permit a state to deny equal protection of
the laws to persons who unmistakably were within the scope of
the clause. Thus, in Truax v. Raich,94 Arizona unsuccessfully pro-
posed a special interest exception to the Equal Protection Clause
that would have permitted it to deny equal protection to aliens
residing in the state with respect to private employment. Never-
theless, the Truax Court affirmed a special interest exception for
"the public domain . . . [and] the common property or resources
of the people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited
to its citizens as against both aliens and citizens of other States."9 '
In Toomer v. Witsell, the special rights and privileges exception
to the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, which had
automatically permitted a state to deny equal protection of the
laws to citizens of other states in the matter of these rights and
privileges, was finally repudiated. 6 It is true that Toomer explained
how McCready might be distinguished.9 7 However, the Court in
Toomer refused to admit that McCready had created any exception
at all to the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, even
though McCready had created an exception in the clearest possible
language. In Toomer, the Court said that "the McCready exception
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, if such it be, should not
be expanded to cover this case."98s Moreover, the Court correctly
observed that "in only one case, McCready v. Virginia,... has the
Court actually upheld State action discriminating against com-
mercial fishing or hunting by citizens of other States where there
were advanced no persuasive independent reasons justifying the
discrimination."'9 9 However, the Court made it quite clear that a
state is no longer free to discriminate against citizens of other
states, unless persuasive independent reasons justifying the discrim-
ination are advanced, by its statement that the Interstate Privileges
93 Id. at 367.
94 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
95 Id. at 39-40.
9 At the same time, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Conm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948), decided that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a state
from excluding aliens residing in the state from its commercial fishery,
notwithstanding the state's special interest in the fishery.
97 334 U.S. at 401.
98 Id. at 402.
99 Id. at 400.
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and Immunities Clause "does bar discrimination against citizens
of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimi-
nation beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States."100
Consequently, the special rights and privileges exception to the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause should no longer exist,
and citizens of other states should now receive the same standard
of equal protection as a state's own citizens.
As one author has observed:
So, a third clause was added to the amendment: the clause which
provides that "no state shall deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." Read in the light of the
prior law, these words seem perfectly plain in intention: they were
intended to supplement the old, inadequate Interstate Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, by destroying utterly the
state power which had survived thereunder, of discriminating
between 'persons" in the predicament which this Equal Protection
Clause describes; that is, "person[s] within [a state's] jurisdiction"
• . . And if "equality in protection" were accorded to these, it
would have likewise to be accorded to all other "citizens", also,
under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
original Constitution.' 0'
The special rights and privileges exception to the Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause should be repudiated expressly because
it did not survive the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and
because it has been rejected by the precedents.
V. CONCLUSION
The equality clauses of the Constitution would permit a state
to give an admission preference to citizens from states that want
to participate extensively in interstate education on terms of
equality to nonresidents. This kind of participation in interstate
education cannot exist without some kind of reciprocal sharing
among the states. Classification with consequential differences in
treatment is permissible to realize objectives that otherwise could
not be accomplished.
Naturally, adjustments by the states would be required to
balance in-migration with out-migration. A few states have a com-
paratively large imbalance of in-migration over out-migration. The
imbalance for Michigan was 11,978 in 1963, 16,618 in 1968.102 How-
ever, most schools are crowded today. A state ordinarily could
rectify an imbalance of in-migration over out-migration by admit-
ting more of its citizens to its schools.
100 Id. at 396.
101 2 W. CRossK-Y, note 71 supra, at 1097.
102 See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
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On the other hand, a few states have a large imbalance of out-
migration over in-migration. In 1963, Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, and Pennsylvania
had imbalances of out-migration respecting state schools that were
more than ten percent of the enrollment in their state schools. 0 3
In 1968, the same condition persisted in those states except Con-
necticut and Nevada. 0 4 Such states may not have enough state-
supported schools to educate all of their citizens who qualify in
every way for a higher education and who can afford-the resident
rate of tuition.
In 1963, the population of New York was more than twice the
population of Michigan, 16,782,304 to 7,823,194. 205 Nevertheless, in
1963 Michigan had almost as many students in its state colleges
and universities as New York had, 146,065 to 154,715, although those
conditions had changed drastically by 1968, 244,817 to 362,453.106 A
similar disparity exists when Michigan is compared with Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey. In 1960, the population of Pennsylvania was
11,319,366, almost half again as large as Michigan's population of
7,823,194.107 However, in 1963 Michigan had almost three times as
many students in its state colleges and universities as Pennsyl-
vania had, 146,065 to 56,356.108 The disparity had diminished in
1968 to 244,817 to 177,953.109 New Jersey had 56,617 students in
its state schools of higher learning in 1963 and 85,452 in 1968.110 The
population of New Jersey in 1960 was 6,066,782.1' In 1963, Illinois's
net out-migration of students was 14,482 and in 1968 it was 23,896.112
The discriminatory tuition charge against nonresidents permits
some states to establish fewer education facilities than its quali-
fied citizens need at a saving to its taxpayers, to its students who
are educated at home, or to both groups. Since the discriminatory
nonresident tuition charge is unconstitutional, those states should
be induced to build more educational facilities or to refuse an
education to a number of their citizens equal to the number of their
emigrgs who would return home after other states had phased
103 See Appendix, Table 1.
104 See Appendix, Table 2.
105 THE WoRLD ALmANAC AND BOOK Op FACTS 593 (L. Long ed. 1969).
106 See Appendix, Tables I and 2.
107 Note 105 supra.
108 See Appendix, Table 1.
109 See Appendix, Table 2.
110 See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
"1I Note 105 supra.
112 See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
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them out of interstate education. Each state should be made re-
sponsible for the education of its own citizens. No state, especially
not some of the Union's richest states, should be allowed to use
a discriminatory tuition charge against migrating students as a
substitute for an obligation to its own citizens that should either
be met or repudiated. The reaction of states that have surplus edu-
cational facilities would not likely be immediate. Instead, they
might wait until states with deficits of educational facilities decided
what to do about these deficits. In the meantime, the deficit states
could consider making direct cash payments, in amounts agreeable
to both sides, to the states now accommodating the deficit states'
students.
Interstate education can be administered to migrating students
with equal tuition charges if the states wishing to participate ex-
tensively in interstate education balance out-migration with in-
migration at whatever number they select. If that was done, a state
would not have to be concerned about the circumstance that its
in-migration from a particular state was more than its out-migration
to that state because that particular imbalance would be offset by
imbalances in the other direction with other states. Furthermore,
the states would not have to be concerned with the fact that resi-
dent tuition rates are different among the states; that condition
exists among various state schools within a state. A migrating
student could weigh that fact as he weighs other facts when he
applies to the school of his choice.
Of course, some states might insist on exchanging students on
the basis of a one to one ratio, or states whose tuition is relatively
low might try to obtain its worth to the penny respecting its citi-
zens who migrate to a state whose tuition is comparatively high.
On the other hand, a state whose tuition is relatively high might
look askance at the education of its migrating citizens at a com-
paratively low tuition in other states if the state with the higher
charge were asked to make up the difference to the lower tuition
states on some reciprocal basis. The short answer to all such possi-
bilities is that since each state is free to withdraw from interstate
education completely, it should be free to administer interstate
education in a difficult rather than easy way if it prefers difficulty
to ease, as long as that state observes equal protection of the laws.
A higher tuition state could legally stipulate that its migrating
citizens could be charged the average rate of tuition in its state
schools even though that average rate would be higher than the
resident rate in the lower tuition states, provided the latter states
expressed willingness to hold the difference for the purpose of
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settling accounts. The Interstate Compacts Clause of the Constitu-
tion" 3 would not stand in the way." 4 A liberal reciprocity is per-
mitted among the states because they are expected to cooperate
in many matters. It is true that such a policy would permit a state
to collect higher tuition than its resident rate from some nonresi-
dents. However, the difference would be held to settle accounts
between the higher and lower tuition states. Since each state in
effect would be using other states' schools as its own in a limited
way, a higher tuition state would charge its citizens its own average
rate of tuition when they migrated to other states' schools, so that
its migrating citizens would pay the same rate of tuition as their
fellow citizens who remained at home.
A state is permitted to measure a person's rights by the more
restrictive rule of the state where he is domiciled, if the latter state
agrees, rather than by its own more liberal rule when his domicil-
iary state may be deemed to have a greater interest in the matter."
The state where a person is domiciled has the greatest interest in
his education. If Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania decided to measure tuition by ability to
pay, they could permit other states to charge migrating students
from those six states the same average tuition that the students
would have paid if they had remained at home, provided the other
states manifested a willingness to hold the tuition difference to settle
accounts. However, if such a policy were followed, a state could
not give an admission preference to students who could pay higher
tuition since states cannot give such a preference to their own
citizens.
Furthermore, if the states should foolishly decide to exchange
students one to one, they should be permitted to do so. If the matter
should turn out that way, the interstate migration of students
probably would not decrease after adjustments were made, even
though existing patterns of in-flow and out-flow between some states
would change. However, nettlesome account keeping, inefficient
bureaucratic regulation, and a one-to-one exchange ratio need not
occur. Each state could balance its in-migration with a desirable
out-migration. If the states should want to try to do more, then they
should make the attempt. The effort would at least create jobs for
data processors without doing any real harm. An interstate educa-
tion would be put within the reach of every student in the country
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
114 Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 586 (1953); Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1939); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518-20
(1893).
115 Cf. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
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who could manage the resident rate of tuition if they, their parents,
and others would make the necessary sacrifices. The states should
not be permitted to single out migrants for discriminatory treat-
ment simply because they, like nonmigrants, cause problems that
governments were created to solve. The states should be forbidden
from exacting unequal and unfair contributions to public higher
education from migrating students simply because they migrate.
APPENDIX
Table 1 for 1963 is an excerpt from a survey made by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare and entitled: Residence and Migra-
tion of college students, Fall 1963 State and regional data.
Table 2 for 1968 is an excerpt from a pre-publication copy of a similar
survey, and minor modifications of the 1968 table still could be made. In
both tables, the column for "Students Enrolled" has the number of students
who attended public institutions of higher learning in each state, and the
column for "Student Residents" contains the number of each state's resi-
dents who attended public institutions of higher learning in the United
States.
TABLE 1.-Residence and Migration of All Students: Publicly-Controlled
Institutions, Fall 1963.
S e I Migration of StudentsI Students IStudent
State -Enrolled I Residents Out of I Into f Net
50 States & D.C. 2,633,345 2,595,756 277,477 315,066 +37,589
Alabama 31,980 31,226 3,922 4,676 +754
Alaska 1,226 2,080 1,078 224 -854
Arizona 44,757 38,004 1,821 8,574 +6,753
Arkansas 22,677 22,971 2,921 2,627 -294
California 484,686 473,531 15,318 26,473 +11,155
Colorado 38,206 30,377 2,782 10,611 +7,829
Connecticut 23,457 26,228 4,298 1,527 -2,771
Table 1 Continued on Next Page
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TABLm 1-Residence and Migration of Al Students: Publicly-Controlled
Institutions, Fall 1963. (continued)
S I Migration of StudentsStudents I Student .Enrolled Residents Out of [ Into I NetState
Delaware 5,954
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TABLE 2.-Residence and Migration of All Students: Publicly Controlled
Institutions, Fall 1968.
I I Migration of Students
Students Student -
State Enrolled I Residents Out of into Net
50 States & D.C. 4,659,889 4,598,089 441,349 503,149 61,800
Alabama 73,908 71,267 5,456 8,095 2,639
Alaska 2,240 3,169 1,462 538 -924
Arizona 74,869 64,055 2,779 13,593 10,814
Arkansas 37,173 37,237 4,334 4,270 -64
California 710,631 699,481 23,281 34,431 11,150
Colorado 78,095 63,539 4,554 18,110 14,556
Connecticut 50,206 53,115 7,678 4,769 -2,909
Delaware 10,342 9,073 2,110 3,379 1,269
District of Columbia 5,346 9,275 4,058 129 -3,929
Florida 134,850 138,468 14,426 10,808 -3,618
Georgia 78,126 74,201 7,911 11,836 3,925
Hawaii 22,845 22,331 4,184 4,698 514
Idaho 19,064 19,517 3,155 2,702 -453
Illinois 221,055 244,951 36,456 12,500 -23,856
Indiana 118,504 106,595 8,849 20,758 11,909
Iowa 57,883 61,187 13,435 10,111 -3,324
Kansas 74,858 69,600 6,478 11,536 5,058
Kentucky 67,031 60,893 6,711 12,849 6,138
Louisiana 93,287 91,585 4,860 6,562 1,702
Maine 13,247 12,989 1,795 2,053 258
Maryland 74,019 73,277 9,716 10,458 742
Massachusetts 67,998 70,453 12,679 4,222 -8,457
Michigan 244,817 228,201 8,265 24,881 16,616
Minnesota 97,038 96,114 9,117 10,041 924
Mississippi 54,344 51,771 3,553 6,126 2,573
Missouri 108,017 102,478 11,288 16,827 5,539
Montana 21,577 20,859 2,236 2,963 727
Nebraska 43,791 42,221 4,106 5,676 1,570
Nevada 9,355 9,599 1,919 1,675 -244
New Hampshire 10,514 9,437 1,755 2,832 1,077
New Jersey 85,452 113,135 32,944 5,261 -27,683
New Mexico 34,037 32,354 3,981 5,664 1,683
New York 362,453 399,179 45,628 8,902 -36,726
North Carolina 78,081 69,927 5,533 14,587 9,054
North Dakota 28,077 21,963 2,485 3,599 1,114
Ohio 228,583 221,266 20,404 27,721 7,317
Oklahoma 77,723 72,243 4,525 10,005 5,480
Oregon 71,359 66,812 3,795 8,342 4,547
Pennsylvania 177,953 196,222 30,930 12,670 -18,260
Rhode Island 15,329 15,205 2,085 2,209 124
South Carolina 29,307 27,696 4,910 6,521 1,611
South Dakota 20,050 19,228 2,379 3,201 822
Tennessee 79,895 73,498 6,765 13,164 6,399
Texas 281,350 273,091 11,320 19,579 8,259
Utah 41,780 37,529 1,716 5,948 4,232
Vermont 8,042 8,511 1,259 2,790 1,531
Virginia 73,243 75,064 14,663 12,842 -1,821
Washington 104,126 97,720 5,482 11,882 6,400
West Virginia 41,802 35,518 3,138 9,422 6,284
Wisconsin 123,948 110,402 6,946 20,492 13,546
Wyoming 12,286 11,494 1,866 2,658 792
